Hereby states are very important and they do not have to have conceptual content when nonconceptual info is there. This is pretty clear seen at the perception of ambiguous figures or in other words optical illusions. When a state has content it goes along with some kind of correctness. There is no need for possession of concepts.
What is typical is that there is distinctive power rather than power of absolute identification.
Phenomenal character intervenes here rather on content. There could be said that representational properties work here top-down. Although the character of experience is not made part by vehicles of representation. It is only that when conditions are not optimal misrepresentation can occur. The connection which has been made is a change in judgement. Which holds extent within categorizing, cognizing and conceptualization.
The relevant content here might be conceptual. The conceptual content of visual experiences is identical with, or determines, the phenomenal character of those experiences. But a concept may only cause a certain state with particular nonconceptual content to be tokened.
For recognition and even for discriminative ability there must be differences in experience that one can learn to recognize or discriminate between. Gestalt switches can occur without conceptual capacities into play. People have propositional attitude by judgement. When they use conceptual abilities they also must use linguistic abilities. Here from comes the use of inference with certain ratio. Intentional explanation requires the ascription of content-involving states.
Maybe we could start from this point by the formulation of navigating skills together with concomitant nonconceptual representations of the spatial properties of the environment and the integration of associated states over time.
To be relatively quasi correct subjects have to quantify their relevance intuitively, to be not of faulty illusionary influence. They do that by representations from heuristics and from social availability or representativeness. Where correction could be implied spontaneous.