Donnerstag, 29. Januar 2015
Like monkeys humans are social animals whereby the importance lies at the interaction with others. During this interaction we manifest our innerstates (intentions, dispositions, thoughts) by means of public behavior. We repeat this by zooming in, into those states like by witnessing. This process of detection helps to help in the anticipation of future events. So it is possible to adapt the own behavior. Like to cooperative, noncooperative, or being dangerous. There is a relationship between control of action and the understanding of action. This comes abroad by mirror-neurons into and with embodied simulation. Whereby the intentional attunement hypothesis is formulated.
The distinction between movement, motor acts, and actions is helpful to understand the full social orientation system. The first is only for simple events. The second is goal-directed and can be influenced by rewards. So that more complex goals can be achieved. Actions themselves, are not only goal-directed, they are active and make use of representation. Yes, they use the representation of the whole system as having an intention. The system is represented as an agent.
Although intention as representation has been many years ignored in science now they even stress the importance of canonical neurons which handle redundant info. By information-theory has been given this is important because in some way or the other we have to organize so many information in our daily lives. Canonical neurons become active at will and they activate certain motor-schemas which are responsible for control and response. Their function is more multimodal than mirror-neurons. The representations are more relational specified. More in relation with the interactional agent. The "aboutness" is stressed. Although it takes time before you activate this system with thinking alone. This shaping is more than a worldview. It is about controlling or actions in the environment in an adaptive way.
Goalstates are represented and structured along an axis of valence. It possesses a value for the system. What has value preserves an organism its integrity (e.g. homeostasis). To maintain integration on higher levels of complexity and to achieve procreative success. But rewarding is very important into this. Into this real agents are more effective. At eightteen months children can observe structurally by the means of intentions of others. This distinction they make already at six months. They understand who they know. This is a specific development-mechanism to make interpretation of action as goal-directed. Which is defined within the teleological stance hypothesis. Funny thing is that they don't have to be really mental. But they are goal-directed. Another principle is the principle of rational action which is important to be efficient for context. Which causes controversy into this debate.
Another link is the one between action-understanding and action-experience. There is a constructional effect of observational and self-agentive experience. Which brings the concept of habituation into being. What is of importance here that there needs to be a congruence with the repertoire. So there can be imitation, and therefore we need to recognize goals! This is in phylogeny the evaluation of contextual adequacy. The distinction is made between behavioral-cue-reading and mind-cue-reading. Achieving of goals is important for our system to take something up. Into this all we are "we-centric" and take the whole also in account as simulation. This is embodied and without real mentalistic endeavor. Experience is in fact knowing your world. This is true empathy. This embodiment is rather functional than structural. It is an attunement, like stated earlier. So is social cognition not "all-or-nothing."