Montag, 9. Februar 2015

Jean-Luc Petit.

This philosopher tries to defend the stance there is a constitution for the I within kinesthesia. So would be the processes of encoding, translating and decoding be part within "the own body." Even if this can't be reduced to a single cel. This could be a subject for the future to incorporate this relation in a more straightforward fashion. Right now a lot attention goes to the types of coding. For instance "population coding," "temporal coding," and "volume coding." Neuroscientists try to unravel the link with patterns of behavioral conduct. Even if typical rules of scientific genesis fail. There is no thing to test philosophical ideas for instance.

From phenomenology this can be understood as a failure to understand intentionality of sense-giving acts and constitutive operators where in every person experiences his sense-of-being. There is stated there is a field of vivid actuality against a background of indifferent inactivation from which access exists. In this way alone, things get their importance for the agent. Since the biography is of most importance for the agent. This is the reality for the agent with the thing in question.

Husserl has made a theory which seems to be of importance in this subject. Namely, the theory of intentionality of consciousness. Which is quite different from the peripheral sensations of movement by James or Innervationgefühle by Wündt. Because there is only here spoken of a kinesthesia with(in) the I. Even if kinesthesia is the only way for the embodied consciousness. It expands and retracts through its material inscription. Where neural maps come to existence from synchronization and dissynchronization of oscillatory patterns. Such a map changes and goes towards other maps in a process of spatialization and temporalization of the mind. With the final destination in the "vivid world."

This process starts modest within the body-brain transactional undertendencies. Whereby some are already intentional accepted while others have to processed in a top-down fashion by the frontoparietal network. This within a flux of experience. So there exists a centralization: a process of modification, by identification. There is a shift to pre-empiric transcendental structure. By this actualization experience becomes possible. Fixed objects are seen into a spatiotemporal way. It are adumbrations: reports or representations within an outline. Which is organized within a permanent configuration. "A manifold." Which is definite under expectations of the subject. It has the structure of a multiplicity. Where we ever want to know more. So there exists a passive sensibility and an active constitution. Which is transcendental. The subjectified becomes objectified, and the objective becomes subjectified. This process of diversification is of a lower order than perceptual apprehension. It has more a link with expectations. Where body works constitutive. For visus but also sound and sense. Attention is herby held important for less active parts. Attention has its role for the constitution of consciousness. This probably deals with the fact neurons which are tired are also active in a single neuron perspective. Also the fronto-parietal network might play here its role. New networks can be centralized by the unconscious component of attention. So there is again a bond with intentionality possible.

Keine Kommentare:

Kommentar veröffentlichen