Dienstag, 10. Februar 2015

Jean-Michel Roy.

He states there has too little interest shown for pragmatism, in general. Since pragmatism has a close relationship with intention. So there has to be looked closer to this relation. He sums up some useful ideas about the properties. Like cognitive relevance of intentionality (relevant versus irrelevant), the nature of this property (subject-object relation or broad), the determination of intentionality (existence or goal), and also the naturalization of intentionality (vague). He regards the difference between intention and intentionality as a good one and makes the connection with different non-reductionistic functions and emergencies. Some names are noted which are foremost known in the area of neuroscience. Like Michael Gazzaniga and Steve Kosslyn. Also Michael Posner with (his) attentional networks. And Paul and Patricia Churchland. Cognitive (neuro)science is plausible but not always linked. It are two different disciplines.

Neither how, he states that action could or could not be central to intention. Rather central! Because action is so linked with pragmatics. But there are certain other cognitive aspects that are of importance. Also it is stated that a goal is necessary, also a characteristic of action. Although intention can also be so formulated that it is possible also without action. Into the process of attributing features we have to see the sense of it, although.

Then he ends with eight claims were he in short claims that goals must be encoded, that situation specifies action and the most fruitful area is the visual part. He claims also that motor imagination can play its role. Like in The Embodied Mind. Written by Varela. Perception is mostly seen as active although there exists exception. In this way he presupposes an unification by integration between action and perception.

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